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Abstract
Prior research on self-other differences involving risk have found that individuals make riskier decisions for others
than for the self in situations where risk taking is valued. We expand this research by examining whether the direction
of self-other differences reverses when risk aversion is valued, as predicted by social values theory (Stone & Allgaier,
2008). Two studies tested for self-other differences in physical safety scenarios, a domain where risk aversion is valued.
In Study 1, participants read physical safety and romantic relationship scenarios and selected what they would decide
for themselves, what they would decide for a friend, or what they would predict their friend would decide. In Study
2, participants read public health scenarios and either decided or predicted for themselves and for a friend. In keeping
with social values theory, participants made more risk-averse decisions for others than for themselves in situations
where risk aversion is valued (physical safety scenarios) but more risk-taking decisions for others than for themselves
in situations where risk taking is valued (relationship scenarios). Further, we show that these self-other differences
in decision making do not arise from incorrectly predicting others’ behaviors, as participants predicted that others’
decisions regarding physical safety scenarios would be either similar (Experiment 1) or more risk taking (Experiment 2)
than their own decisions.
Keywords: decision making, predictions of decisions, self-other differences, social values, risk taking, risk aversion.
1 Introduction
Imagine the following scenario. You are boarding your
flight and nearing your seat. You see that the person who
will be sitting next to you is already seated and clearly
sick with what seems like the flu. You tend to get sick
easily and you would really like to avoid getting ill. You
could ask the flight attendant to help you find another seat
away from this sick passenger, but it would be a bit of a
hassle to do so since you would have to wait until all of
the other passengers were seated. What do you do?
These types of decision dilemmas—whereby a choice
needs to be made between a risky alternative (e.g., taking
the seat next to the sick passenger) and a safer alterna-
tive (e.g., asking for a different seat)—have formed a cor-
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nerstone of judgment and decision-making research for
years. A body of research has shown, however, that peo-
ple make decisions for others differently from the way
they make decisions for themselves in situations as di-
verse as giving advice to a friend who is confronted with
the example above, to making medical decisions for a
loved one who is unable to make decisions for him- or
herself. In particular, people respond to risk differently
when they are at risk themselves compared to when it is
another person at risk (e.g., Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp,
& Allgaier, 2003; Borresen, 1987; Fernandez-Duque &
Wifall, 2007; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012; Ray-
mark, 2000; Roszkowski & Snelbecker, 1990; Stone &
Allgaier, 2008; Wray & Stone, 2005).
One approach to explaining self-other differences in-
corporates research investigating prediction errors, such
as affective forecasting (e.g., Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson,
Blumberg & Wheatley, 1998) and differential affective
states regarding decisions for self and others (e.g., Bur-
son, Faro, & Rottenstreich, 2010; Faro & Rottenstre-
ich, 2006; Hsee & Weber, 1997; Loewenstein, Weber,
Hsee, & Welch, 2001). For example, Faro and Rotten-
streich combined the idea of an “empathy gap” (Loewen-
stein, 1996), where people underestimate the role of af-
fective elements when predicting the decisions of others,
with the “risk-as-feelings” argument (Loewenstein et al.,
2001) that self choices are driven to a large extent by
affective feelings. In particular, Faro and Rottenstreich
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showed that predictions are often too regressive, due to
an inability to appreciate the extent to which others’ de-
cisions are influenced by emotions to the same extent as
self decisions.
When people’s predictions of what others would do is
inaccurate, it stands to reason that people might decide
differently for them as well, to the extent that one at-
tempts to decide for another person in the same manner
by which the other person would decide for him- or her-
self. In contrast to this idea, Stone and Allgaier’s (2008)
social values theory suggests that people’s decisions for
others are not based on what they think the other per-
son would do, but instead on what is valued by people
one cares about. The present work provides support for
this theory by showing that people’s decisions are more in
line with what is socially valued when deciding for others
than for the self, regardless of whether risk seeking or risk
aversion is valued, and that these self-other differences in
decision making emerge in the absence of prediction er-
rors (Experiment 1) and even when the prediction errors
occur in the opposite direction (Experiment 2).
1.1 Social values theory
Building on the work of Kray and Gonzalez (1999) and
Kray (2000) on multiattribute choice, Stone and All-
gaier (2008) developed social values theory to explain
how people make decisions for others in the domain of
risky decision making. Social values theory states that
the social value1 placed on risk in the situation is the
predominant factor when making decisions for others.
Thus, the decision maker does not weigh the pros and
cons of that behavior prior to telling the person what to
do. Instead, the decision maker follows a norm to make
the socially-sanctioned decision for the other person (see
Teigen, Olsen, & Solås, 2005 for a similar account re-
garding gift giving). In contrast, when making a decision
for oneself, the decision maker considers a host of factors
(including the value placed on risk).
Stone and Allgaier (2008) provided support for this
theory in three experiments, reasoning as follows. If so-
cial values theory is correct, risk taking should be valued
1The issue of whether something is valued can be addressed on
many different levels. For example, Baron (2003) distinguishes between
moral goals of decision making (making decisions based on another
person’s values) and moralistic goals (independent of the other person’s
values). We adopted the term “social values” from Rohan (2000), who
defined a social value system as “people’s perceptions of others’ judg-
ments about best possible living or functioning” (p. 265). As such, we
assume that people are making decisions for others that they believe are
in the others’ best interests, but are attending to the social group’s value,
not to the other person’s individual values. Thus, we use the term social
value to indicate that it is the perceived value of one’s social group that
is relevant, not necessarily the person’s personal values. At the same
time, these values do not have the type of ethical (or protected value)
element that is frequently associated with moralistic values.
in situations where people make more risky decisions for
others than for the self. Conversely, risk taking should
not be valued in situations that do not show self-other dif-
ferences. To test this idea, they categorized the work on
self-other differences into three domains: monetary, low-
impact relationship, and high-impact relationship scenar-
ios, and then investigated whether risk is valued in each
domain. In monetary scenarios and in high-impact re-
lationship scenarios, typically no self-other differences
exist (Beisswanger et al., 2003; Cvetkovich, 1972;
Slovic, Weinstein, & Lichtenstein, 1967; Stone, Yates, &
Caruthers, 2002; Teger & Kogan, 1975), whereas in low-
impact relationship scenarios, people make more risk-
taking decisions for others than for themselves (Beiss-
wanger et al., 2003; Wray & Stone, 2005). In keeping
with this pattern of self-other differences, Stone and All-
gaier found that risk was valued in low-impact relation-
ship decisions, but not in the other two domains. Further,
they found that, in scenarios where risk taking was val-
ued, deciding for another person to take risk-averse ac-
tions was judged to be more inappropriate than choosing
such risk-averse actions for oneself, providing further ev-
idence that the self-other differences were due to a differ-
ence in perceived norms.
Lastly, in their third experiment, Stone and Allgaier
reasoned that if decisions for others are based predomi-
nantly on the value placed on risk, then self-other differ-
ences should persist even when participants do not sys-
tematically expect that others would make more or less
risky decisions than they themselves would make and re-
gardless who the decision recipient was. Indeed, a sep-
arate group of participants predicted that others would
make decisions that corresponded with decisions made by
participants deciding for themselves. Further, self-other
differences in decision making emerged both when par-
ticipants decided for a friend and for a “typical student”.
1.2 Examining self-other differences in
physical safety scenarios
In the domains examined by Stone and Allgaier (2008),
all either produced no self-other differences or greater
risk taking for others than for the self. If social values
theory is correct, then the fact that people never made less
risky decisions for others in the scenarios investigated by
Stone and Allgaier is just an artifact of the domains that
they investigated, and not because risk taking is gener-
ally valued in society (e.g., as in culture-value theory, as
discussed by Brown, 1965). This is an important consid-
eration because the main theoretical contribution of so-
cial values theory is to suggest that what is valued in a
situation (i.e., either risk taking or risk aversion) is the
predominant determination of how people decide for oth-
ers. Thus, if risk aversion is valued, decisions for oth-
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ers should be less risk-taking than decisions for the self.
The present study therefore expands upon the existing re-
search on self-other differences by examining whether
self-other differences occur in a domain in which risk
aversion is valued.
Of course, a priori, it is not possible to know with cer-
tainty when risk aversion will be valued, but situations
invoking physical safety concerns seem likely to pro-
duce a social value placed on avoiding risk.2 As seen
in Schwartz’s work on the structure of the value system
(e.g., Schwartz, 1992), security concerns are one type of
universal value. Since physical safety entails security, it
seems likely that risk aversion would be valued in these
sorts of situations. To test this assumption, we measured
the social value placed on risk in physical safety scenarios
prior to our examination of self-other differences.
Having documented that risk aversion is valued in
physical safety scenarios, we examined self-other differ-
ences with two different types of physical safety scenar-
ios. The first experiment used a range of situations that
would typically confront undergraduate students and that
involve physical safety concerns. The second experiment
used public health scenarios with physical safety con-
cerns. Our primary goal in both experiments was to test
our prediction that decisions for others would be less risk
taking (more risk averse) than decisions for the self in
physical safety scenarios, presumably due to the value
placed on risk aversion in these situations. Further, in
Experiment 1, we included a set of relationship scenarios
to show that, within the same experimental context, de-
cisions for others could be either more or less risk-taking
than decisions for the self.
Our second goal in both experiments was to test the so-
cial values account of self-other differences versus a mis-
prediction account. As discussed previously, according to
the social values account, what one thinks the other per-
son would do is largely irrelevant, as decisions for others
are based predominantly on social values and decision-
making norms based on them. In contrast, the mispre-
diction account says that people mispredict how others
would decide and make decisions for them in accord with
these (erroneous) expectations.
Note that this misprediction hypothesis is consistent
with many leading decision theories. For example, con-
strual level theory (CLT; e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2010)
states that people traverse psychological distance in refer-
ence to the present self and view others in terms of more
central, high-level concepts the further they are from one-
2We acknowledge that certain situations invoking physical safety
concerns may also invoke social values involving courage and favor
risk taking by certain individuals (e.g., soldiers, firefighters). However,
for the scope of our research, we are interested in examining situations
whereby risk is not valued, and so physical safety scenarios were se-
lected as a reasonable example whereby risk aversion would be the pre-
dominant social value in most situations.
self. People’s predictions and decisions for others could
well be based on such high-level concepts, such as the
person’s attitude toward risk, which could play a reduced
role in self decisions. Further, much recent work, as seen
for example in Loewenstein et al.’s (2001) “risk as feel-
ings” account, shows that self decisions are based to a
large extent on one’s affective reactions toward risk, and
work by Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) and others sug-
gests that people underestimate the role of emotions in
decisions by others, leading to prediction errors (see also
Fernandez-Duque & Wifall, 2007; Hsee & Weber, 1997;
Laran, 2010.) This concern seems especially warranted in
physical safety scenarios, as affective fears would be par-
ticularly strong in these situations, given the potential for
physical harm. To examine the relevance of each of these
theories in explaining self-other differences, we thus in-
cluded a prediction condition in each of our experiments.
To the extent that self-other differences in decision mak-
ing mirror self-other differences in prediction, this find-
ing would support a misprediction account of self-other
differences. To the extent that self-other differences in
decision making occur despite a lack of self-other differ-
ences in prediction, this finding would support the social
values theory claim that decisions for others are based on
factors distinct from how the decision maker thinks the
other person would decide for him- or herself.
1.3 Pretest examining the role of social val-
ues in physical safety and relationship
scenarios
The social values prediction is predicated on the assump-
tion that risk taking is valued in relationship scenarios
but risk aversion is valued in physical safety scenar-
ios. Before conducting the first experiment, we con-
ducted a pretest to test this assumption and to deter-
mine which scenarios have a clear value either for, or
against, risk taking to use in the first experiment. We
took four romantic relationship scenarios from Stone and
Allgaier’s (2008) previous work, adapted Loewenstein et
al.’s (2001) taxi cab scenario, and constructed 24 addi-
tional physical safety and two additional romantic rela-
tionship scenarios in a similar form, for a total of 31 sce-
narios. Each scenario presented a dilemma within a given
situation (e.g., needing to stay up late to study during fi-
nals week) with two possible options—a risk-taking op-
tion (e.g., taking a pill to stay up later) and a risk-averse
option (e.g., not taking the pill).
To determine whether risk was valued in each scenario,
the value placed on risk was measured in two different
ways. First, we used the actual vs. ideal self procedure
used by Stone and Allgaier (2008), which they adapted
from Levinger and Schneider (1969) and Brown (1965).
In this procedure, participants are presented with two
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people, one of whom does the risky action and one of
whom does the less risky action. Each participant is then
asked either which of these two people is closer to how
1) ‘your “ideal self” would behave’ or 2) ‘how you would
behave.’ In keeping with previous research using this ap-
proach (e.g., Levinger & Schneider, 1969; Stone & All-
gaier, 2008), the ideal self responses were compared to
those of the actual self. To the extent risk is a valued
commodity, participants should make more risk-taking
choices for their ideal selves than they would make for
themselves, and to the extent risk aversion is valued, par-
ticipants should make more risk-averse choices for their
ideal selves than they would actually make. One concern
with this approach, however, is that we are inferring what
society values from hypothetical choices that participants
make. Thus, we also used a second method for measuring
value, where participants rated the extent to which their
social group would approve of their decision if they were
to take each of the risk-taking and risk-averse actions.
To the extent risk is valued, participants should indicate
greater approval for taking the risk-taking action than the
risk-averse action, and to the extent risk aversion is val-
ued, participants should indicate greater approval associ-
ated with the risk-averse choice.
Three hundred and nine undergraduate students (162
women, 147 men) enrolled in an introductory psychol-
ogy course responded to the questions about their ideal
and actual selves (order of ideal to actual self counter-
balanced between participants) first and then responded
to the approval questions. Additionally, they answered
questions regarding whether the scenarios dealt with
physical safety and which of the two options entailed
more risk, to check whether our opinions about the
scenarios matched the participants’ perceptions. Since
there were different numbers of relationship and physical
safety scenarios, 1) each of the actual and ideal choices
were converted to percentages of risk-taking choices such
that higher percentages indicated a greater percentage of
risk-taking actions for the actual (ideal) self, and 2) re-
sponses to the approval ratings were averaged for the risk-
averse actions and those of the risk-taking actions.
1.4 Assessing value
To assess value using the actual-ideal method, a repeated
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) compared ac-
tual vs. ideal choices for physical safety and relationship
scenarios. There was a highly significant Decision Type
(actual vs. ideal) by Scenario Type (physical safety vs.
relationships) interaction, F (1, 303) = 391.61, p < .001,
2partial =.564.
3 As expected, in physical safety scenar-
ios, participants made a lower percentage of risk-taking
3Although the ideal-actual differences were somewhat stronger for
women than for men, the basic pattern of results held for both genders.
choices for their ideal selves (M = 29.8%) than for their
actual selves (M = 43.2%), paired t(306) = 13.43, p <
.001, and in relationship scenarios, participants made a
greater percentage of risk-taking choices for their ideal
selves (M = 63.1%) than for their actual selves (M =
33.9%), paired t(306) = 15.03, p < .001.
Next, a repeated measures ANOVA compared the ap-
proval ratings of each action in the scenarios. These re-
sults mirrored the actual vs. ideal results. Specifically,
there was a highly significant Action Type (risk-taking vs.
risk-averse) x Scenario Type (physical safety vs. relation-
ships) interaction, F(1,305) = 280.52, p < .001, 2partial
= .479. As predicted, for safety scenarios, the mean ap-
proval ratings for the risk-averse actions (M = 4.76) were
greater than those for the risk-taking actions (M = 3.78),
paired t(308) = 13.70, p < .001. For relationship scenar-
ios, the opposite pattern was found: the mean approval
ratings for the risk-averse actions (M = 4.25) were lower
than those for the risk-taking actions (M = 4.96), paired
t(308) = 9.35, p < .001.
1.5 Selection of scenarios for Experiment 1
The scenarios were analyzed individually to identify
which scenarios to use for the first experiment. We se-
lected physical safety scenarios that produced clear and
strong differences in value as measured by both the ideal-
actual difference approach and by the approval approach
and that maintained these differences for both genders.
Specifically, we included only the scenarios that pro-
duced actual-ideal differences of at least 10% for both
genders (p < .001 for overall tests and p < .01 for each
gender) and differences in approval ratings of at least .10
for both genders (p < .001 for overall tests and p < .01 for
each gender). Eight physical safety scenarios met this cri-
terion and so were used in the first study. These eight sce-
narios also had differences in physical safety concern rat-
ings of at least 1.0 such that the risk-taking action entailed
greater physical safety concerns than the risk-averse ac-
tion (p < .001 for overall tests and for both genders) and
the risk-taking action in each scenario was perceived to
entail more risk than the risk-averse action by at least
93% of our participants.
For the relationship scenarios, only two scenarios met
the above criteria regarding both the actual-ideal differ-
ences and the approval ratings, most likely because we
included only six scenarios in the pretest. Thus, we mod-
ified the criterion to include scenarios that produced sig-
nificant (p < .05) overall differences in the actual-ideal
and approval ratings (five of the six scenarios) and then
chose the four with the greatest actual-ideal differences.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 8, No. 3, May 2013 Self-other differences in risk attitude 254
2 Experiment 1: Self-other differ-
ences in physical safety scenarios
regarding student life
2.1 Method
Participants. Two hundred and seventy undergraduate
students (136 women, 134 men) enrolled in an introduc-
tory psychology course took part in this experiment as
one option for fulfilling a research requirement. These
participants were drawn from the same subject pool as
the pretest participants, but were different people.
Materials. Twelve (eight physical safety and four rela-
tionship) scenarios, selected from the pretest, were used
for this study. (The full set of scenarios is provided
in Appendix A.) Although the majority of the decisions
involved physical safety scenarios, romantic relation-
ship scenarios were included to replicate the previously
found pattern of self-other differences (Beisswanger et
al., 2003; Stone & Allgaier, 2008). The relationship sce-
narios were “low-impact” (Beisswanger et al., 2003) and
were chosen such that risk taking was valued. In con-
trast, the physical safety scenarios were chosen such that
risk aversion was valued. More physical safety scenar-
ios were included than relationship scenarios because the
novel contribution of this study is in regards to physical
safety situations.
The scenarios were randomly ordered with the con-
straint that no two relationship scenarios were next to
each other. Half of the participants saw the scenarios in
this order, whereas the other half saw the scenarios in the
reverse order. Each scenario presented two different ac-
tions and participants either chose between the actions for
themselves, chose between them for a friend, or predicted
what decision their friend would make.
Procedure. Participants were assigned to one of six
conditions, varying by Decision Condition (deciding for
themselves, deciding for a friend, and predicting the deci-
sion of a friend) and Scenario Order (Version A vs. Ver-
sion B), via a randomized block design. Participants in
the decide for self condition were told to assume that they
were in each of the scenarios and were asked “What de-
cision would you make for yourself?” Participants in the
decide for a friend and predict for a friend decision con-
ditions first wrote down the name of a same-sex friend
“who is similar to you in terms of beliefs, attitudes, val-
ues, etc.” and then were asked to assume that it was this
particular friend who was in each of the scenarios. In the
decide for a friend condition, participants were told to
assume that their friend had asked them to make a deci-
sion for him or her and then were asked “What decision
Figure 1: Percentages of risk-taking choices by deci-
sion condition for each scenario type, depicting a highly
significant Decision Type x Scenario Type interaction.
Choices in the self and predict conditions did not statisti-
cally differ, but both significantly differed from decisions
for others (p < .001). n = 91 for the decisions for self and
decisions for a friend conditions; n = 88 for the predic-
tions of a friend’s decisions condition.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
ri
s
k
-t
a
k
in
g
 c
h
o
ic
e
s
Decisions 
for self
Predictions of a
friends's decisions
Decisions 
for a friend
Safety scenarios
Relationship scenarios
would you make for your friend?” In the predict for a
friend condition, participants were asked “What decision
do you think your friend would make for herself [him-
self]?”
2.2 Results
As in the pretest, since there were different numbers of
physical safety and relationship scenarios, we converted
each participant’s responses to percentages of risk-taking
choices within each type of scenario. As shown in Figure
1, decisions for a friend were more risk taking than ei-
ther self-decisions or predictions for relationship scenar-
ios but were more risk averse than either self-decisions
or predictions for physical safety scenarios. That the pat-
tern of self-other differences varied in the different sce-
narios was confirmed by a 3 (Decision Condition: decide
for self, predict a friend’s decision, decide for a friend) x
2 (Scenario Type: safety, relationship) repeated-measures
ANOVA4 on the percentage of risk-taking choices, where
Scenario Type was the within-subjects variable: Decision
Condition x Scenario Type interaction, F(2, 267) = 35.72,
p < .001, 2partial = .211.
4Initially, we included Scenario Order in the ANOVA. However, the
analysis indicated that there was no effect of scenario order, either in
terms of a main effect or interaction with any of the other variables (all
Fs < .76; all ps > .38). Thus, this variable is not considered further.
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Since the omnibus ANOVA effects do not indicate
where the differences lie, we tested our specific hypothe-
ses comparing only two of the conditions at a time. In the
first section, we address whether we found the predicted
pattern of self-other differences in decision making in the
two different domains. In the second section, we exam-
ine predictions of a friend’s decisions in comparison to
the other two decision conditions.
2.3 Self-other differences in decision mak-
ing
As stated above, participants made more risk-taking de-
cisions for themselves than for their friends in physi-
cal safety decisions (M self-other difference = 13%), but
less risk-taking decisions for themselves than for their
friends in relationship decisions (M self-other difference
= 22%). We examined the reliability and consistency of
these effects by conducting a 2 (Decision Condition: de-
cide for self, decide for a friend) x 8 (Scenario) repeated-
measures ANOVA for the physical safety scenarios and
a 2 (Decision Condition: decide for self, decide for a
friend) x 4 (Scenario) repeated-measures ANOVA for the
relationship scenarios.
In physical safety scenarios, participants were more
risk-taking for themselves (M = 30.5%) than they were
for their friends (M = 18.0%), F(1, 180) = 20.23, p <
.001, partial2 = .101. Conversely, for relationship scenar-
ios, participants were less risk-taking for themselves (M
= 54.9%) than they were for their friends (M = 77.2%),
F(1, 180) = 27.07, p < .001, partial2 = .131. In addition,
there were significant Condition by Scenario interactions
for both types of scenarios, F (7, 1260) = 2.25, p = .03,
2partial = .012, and F (3, 540) = 3.05, p = .03, partial
2
= .017, for physical safety and relationship scenarios, re-
spectively.
Given the presence of the Condition by Scenario inter-
actions, we conducted additional tests to determine how
consistently we obtained the observed self-other differ-
ences in decision making. First, the scenarios were an-
alyzed individually by pairwise contrasts. As shown in
Table 1, for all eight physical safety scenarios, partic-
ipants made more risk-taking decisions for themselves
than for their friends, whereas for all four relationship
scenarios participants made more risk-taking decisions
for their friends than for themselves. Thus, the observed
self-other differences in decision making occurred con-
sistently within each domain, although not all of the dif-
ferences were statistically significant.
Next, we conducted an item-based paired t-test (using
the eight safety scenarios as rows and ignoring the pre-
diction condition) in order to test for a general self-other
difference within the safety scenarios, since the main con-
tribution of this study is in regards to finding self-other
differences among situations in which risk aversion is val-
ued. Despite the small number of scenarios, there was a
strong effect of decision condition for the physical safety
scenarios, paired t(7) = 4.00, p = .005, in which deci-
sions for others were generally more risk averse (M =
17.99%) than decisions for the self (M = 30.49%). Fur-
thermore, an item-based ANOVA was conducted using
all twelve scenarios to investigate self-other differences
as a function of decision condition (decide for self, de-
cide for other) and scenario type (romantic relationship,
physical safety). There was a strong interaction between
decision condition and scenario type, F(1, 10) = 36.49, p
< .001, 2partial = .785.
The above analyses show that our overall pattern of re-
sults, whereby decisions for others were more risk averse
than self decisions for physical safety scenarios and more
risk taking than self decisions for relationships scenarios,
generally held in our scenarios. To the extent that social
values theory is correct, however, there should also be dif-
ferences within domains, whereby the situations that pro-
duce the strongest social value also produce the strongest
self-other difference. To examine this issue, we corre-
lated the degree of self-other difference with the social
value, again using the scenario as the unit of analysis.
Specifically, we operationalized social value by taking
the approval and actual vs. ideal responses obtained in
the pretest for each scenario, transforming them into z-
scores, and then averaging them to get an overall measure
of social value. This social value measure was then corre-
lated with the self-other difference measure (as shown in
Table 1), controlling for scenario type. The partial corre-
lation between social value and self-other difference con-
trolling for scenario type was significant, partial r = .69,
p = .02. The significant partial correlation was driven
by a strong relationship with the actual-ideal measure for
safety scenarios and a strong relationship with the ap-
proval measure for the relationship scenarios. Although
based on only a small number of non-randomly-chosen
scenarios, this result provides preliminary evidence for
the social value prediction that scenarios that have the
strongest social value will produce the strongest self-
other difference.
2.4 Predictions of a friend’s decisions
We next examined whether predictions of a friend’s deci-
sions differed from decisions for the self. In contrast to
the results with deciding for friends, there were no self-
other differences in prediction for either of the scenario
types. For physical safety scenarios, participants’ predic-
tions (M = 32.4%) were roughly equivalent to their own
level of risk taking (M = 30.5%), F(1, 177) = 0.39, p =
.53, 2partial = .002. Similarly, for relationship scenar-
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Table 1: Self-other differences in decision making.
Decide for self Decide for friend
Self-other
difference
1-tailed t
Physical safety scenario
Keeping one’s seat on a flight that is
next to a flu-ridden passenger
49:45 16:48 32:97 4:80***
Taking caffeine pills 40:66 27:47 13:19 1:87*
Taking diet pills 24:18 10:99 13:19 2:30*
Putting up an overly heavy shelf 23:08 10:99 12:09 2:06*
Riding in a taxi cab with a drunk
driver
26:37 16:48 9:89 1:60+
Avoiding installation of a security
alarm for apartment
27:47 20:88 6:59 :99
Taking Ritalin-like pills 38:46 31:87 6:59 :92
Not replacing a broken smoke
detector
14:29 8:79 5:49 1:05
Relationship scenario
Asking an attractive person to dance 58:24 91:21  32:97  5:10***
Asking a close friend to date 51:65 76:92  25:27  3:58***
Introducing oneself to an attractive
person
54:95 78:02  23:08  3:28***
Telling dating partner about one’s
strong feelings to move relationship
up a level
54:95 62:64  7:69  1:05
Note. Percentages of risk taking choices for each scenario by decision type. All p-values are 1-tailed, + p < .10,
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
ios, participants’ predictions (M = 53.1%) were roughly
equivalent to their own level of risk taking (M = 54.9%),
F(1, 177) = 0.14, p = .71, 2partial = .001. Finally, there
was no Condition by Scenario interaction for either phys-
ical safety or relationship scenarios (both F’s < 1) and no
self-other differences in prediction for any of the scenar-
ios when tested individually (all t(267)’s 1.66, all p’s
.098). Thus, people were not expecting others to decide
differently from how they would decide for themselves.
Conversely, there were large differences between peo-
ple’s predictions of and decisions for others. In physical
safety scenarios, participants’ predictions (M = 32.4%)
indicated greater risk taking than did their actual deci-
sions for others (M = 18.0%), F(1, 177) = 24.66, p <
.001, 2partial = .122. For relationship scenarios, their
predictions (M = 53.1%) exhibited less risk taking than
did their actual decisions for others (M = 77.2%), F(1,
177) = 34.16, p < .001, partial2 = .162. The Condition by
Scenario interaction did not reach significance for either
type of scenario (both p’s > .09).
2.5 Discussion
As predicted, we found that self-other differences in deci-
sion making varied by domain. In replication of past stud-
ies (Beisswanger et al., 2003; Stone & Allgaier, 2008;
Wray & Stone, 2005), decisions for others were more
risk-taking than self decisions in low-impact romantic re-
lationship scenarios (where risk taking is socially valued).
In addition, we found that self-other differences in phys-
ical safety scenarios (where risk aversion is socially val-
ued) were in the opposite direction of those found in re-
lationship scenarios. We do not claim that people will
make more risk-averse decisions for others than for them-
selves in all physical safety scenarios; indeed, the scenar-
ios were specifically chosen to have a social value placed
on risk aversion. Nonetheless, the consistency of find-
ings across the eight scenarios suggests that this pattern
of behavior is at least common.
Theoretically, this finding of two different directions
of self-other differences using two different domains
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strengthens the social values account of self-other dif-
ferences. For example, being more sensitive to negative
outcomes in decisions for oneself than for another person
could explain the greater risk taking for others in the rela-
tionship domain, but this explanation cannot also account
for the findings in the physical safety domain. In addi-
tion, predictions of others’ decisions did not differ from
self decisions in either domain. This finding provides
strong evidence against a misprediction account of self-
other differences, at least for those found in our study.
This result is also of interest in and of itself, as it provides
information on when people would be expected to accu-
rately predict the behavior of others. Before discussing
the implications of these findings, however, it is impor-
tant to determine how general the effects are. Thus, in
our next study, we explored self-other differences using a
different type of physical safety scenario.
3 Experiment 2: Self-other differ-
ences in public health scenarios
To examine the generality of our findings from Experi-
ment 1, we conducted a second study using public health
scenarios in which the situation entails general health and
safety concerns. The scenarios were based on three possi-
ble real-life situations: an avian flu outbreak, detonation
of a radioactive bomb in one’s neighborhood, and hand
washing behavior during flu season. Each scenario in-
volved the potential for serious harm and was described
in more detail than were the scenarios used in Experi-
ment 1. Further, most of the scenarios (with the possi-
ble exception of the hand washing one) involved situa-
tions that the students had likely not previously thought
about. Due to the (intentional) familiarity and the num-
ber of scenarios used in Experiment 1, it is likely that the
participants did not spend much time thinking about each
scenario in that study. Due to the novelty, seriousness,
and small number of scenarios used here, however, we
expected that the participants would spend longer think-
ing about their responses to each scenario. Although we
had no a priori reason to think that these factors would
influence self-other differences, finding the same results
with such qualitatively different physical safety scenarios
would speak to the generality of the effects.
Finally, we modified the study design from being com-
pletely between-subjects, to one where participants either
made self decisions and decided for another person or
predicted their own behavior and that of another person.
This design should provide the greatest chance of find-
ing that self decisions are different from predictions of
others (since the variable is manipulated within-subjects),
as well as test whether self-other differences in decision
making will emerge with a different study design.
3.1 Method
Participants. Three hundred and twelve male and fe-
male undergraduate students enrolled in introductory
psychology courses took part in this experiment as one
option for fulfilling a course requirement.
Materials. This study used three public health scenar-
ios, involving an avian flu (H5N1) outbreak, a radioac-
tive bomb detonation situation, and hand washing behav-
ior during flu season. The first two scenarios were taken
from Bruine de Bruin, Florig, Fischhoff, Downs, and
Stone (2006) and had previously been used to study US
and Canadian citizens’ anticipated behavioral responses
to risk communications about these threat scenarios. All
three scenarios provided risk information about the sit-
uation, guidelines for safety, and the benefits and chal-
lenges (or inconveniences) of following these guidelines.
For example, in the bird flu scenario, participants were
asked to imagine that an outbreak has occurred in their
city and that as many as 100 million people in the U.S.
could get infected and as many as 6 million could die
from such an infection. The provided safety guidelines
suggest wearing an N-95 surgical mask all the time to
avoid getting sick or to avoid contaminating others if one
is already sick. In addition, however, the scenario pro-
vided some reasons and examples of why following the
guidelines would be difficult (e.g., how always wearing
a mask would be difficult while eating, drinking, and/or
smoking).
After all of the information was presented, participants
were asked to decide or predict how often they (or a
friend) would follow the guidelines for safely wearing a
mask. The response scale was a continuous line, start-
ing at “never follow the above guidelines” to “always fol-
low the above guidelines” with a midpoint (at 6.7 cm) of
“sometimes follow the above guidelines”. Similar to Ex-
periment 1, when deciding or predicting for a friend, par-
ticipants were told to “consider a close same-sex friend of
yours, with similar values, etc.”; unlike that study, how-
ever, they were not asked to write down the name of a spe-
cific friend. Participants responded by placing a slash on
the line to indicate the frequency by which they or their
friend would follow the guidelines. The other two scenar-
ios were analogous in their form, with the exception that
the radioactive bomb scenario asked about length of time
one would remain away due to radiation concerns and had
a categorical response scale, ranging from “1 week”, “1
month”, and so on to “4 years” and “forever” to allow us
to measure the full range of potential responses. The full
set of scenarios is provided in Appendix B.
For all three scenarios, we standardized the response
scale by dividing the participant’s response by the max-
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Figure 2: Extent of risk aversion by decision type for each scenario. N = 156 for each decision type per scenario, total
N = 312.
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imum possible response. Thus, for each scenario the
scale ranges from 0 (maximum risk-taking response) to
1 (maximum risk-averse response).
Procedure. Two versions of the questionnaires were
used. Half of the participants (n = 156) were given the
scenarios and asked to decide for themselves and then for
a same-sex friend. The other half of the participants (n
= 156) were given the scenarios and asked to predict the
behaviors of themselves and then for a same-sex friend.5
All participants received the scenarios in this order: 1)
bird flu, 2) radioactive bomb, 3) hand washing.
3.2 Results
As shown in Figure 2, decisions for a friend were more
risk averse than were self-decisions, but predictions of
friends’ decisions were more risk taking than were self-
decisions. That the pattern of self-other differences was
different for decisions than for predictions was confirmed
via a 2 (Decision Type: decide, predict) x 2 (Decision
Recipient: self, friend) x 3 (Scenario: bird flu, radioac-
tive bomb, hand washing) repeated-measures ANOVA on
5In addition, all participants made hypothetical deci-
sions/predictions for a younger brother and for the society as a
whole—these questions and results will be described elsewhere and are
not shown in the appendix.
the extent of risk aversion, where decision recipient and
scenario were within-subjects variables and decision type
was a between-subjects variable. Specifically, there was a
highly significant Decision Type x Decision Recipient in-
teraction, F(1, 310) = 72.33, p <.001, 2partial = .189. In
addition, the interaction between decision type and deci-
sion recipient was qualified by a relatively weak but sig-
nificant Decision Type x Decision Recipient x Scenario
three-way interaction, F(2, 620) = 3.75, p = .024, 2partial
= .012.
To determine whether the overall two-way decision
type by decision recipient interaction holds generally, we
ran three 2 (Decision Type: decide, predict) x 2 (Decision
Recipient: self, friend) repeated-measures ANOVA’s, one
per scenario. The Decision Type x Decision Recipient
interaction was highly significant for all three scenarios
(all F’s > 20.66, p’s < .001), although it was particularly
strong in the bird flu scenario (2partial = .134 for bird
flu; 2partial = .086 for radioactive bomb, and 
2
partial =
.062 for hand hygiene). For all three scenarios, the pat-
tern of the 2-way interaction was the same: participants
made more risk-averse decisions for their friends than for
themselves, and predicted that their friends would make
less risk-averse decisions than they would make for them-
selves (all t’s > 1.82, p’s < .08, by two-tailed paired t
tests).
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3.3 Discussion
The findings from this study support our conclusion from
Experiment 1 that, for physical safety situations, peo-
ple make more risk-averse decisions for others than for
themselves. Although the scenarios from both studies in-
volved physical safety concerns, the types of safety con-
cerns were quite different. In Experiment 1, the scenar-
ios generally involved day-to-day activities that would be
expected to confront undergraduate students in their daily
lives, such as whether or not to take a caffeine pill to stay
up later. In Experiment 2, the scenarios described serious
public health situations. In both cases, however, there was
a strong tendency to make more risk-averse decisions for
a friend than for oneself.
In addition, this study provided our strongest evidence
yet that people’s decisions for others and predictions of
others’ behavior are based on fundamentally different
mechanisms. Whereas other work we have conducted
(Stone & Allgaier, 2008; Experiment 1 of this paper)
found that self-other differences in decision making oc-
curred when people’s predictions for others matched their
self decisions, this study showed an actual reversal—
people made more risk-averse decisions for others, but
expected them to be less risk averse. The finding that
people expected others to be less risk averse than they
were themselves could be due to the better-than-average
effect (e.g., Levinger & Schneider, 1969; Svenson, 1981),
on the assumption that risk aversion is valued in physical
safety scenarios.
4 General discussion
The present research extends our knowledge of how peo-
ple decide for others by demonstrating that 1) social val-
ues play a greater role in decisions for others than in self
decisions, and 2) decisions for others are not produced
by the same mechanism as are predictions of others’ de-
cisions and will often not align with them. We elaborate
on each of these issues below and end with a discussion
of practical implications of the results.
4.1 The role of social values in decisions for
others
The primary logic of our methodology was to take situa-
tions with known social values and test whether self-other
differences would emerge such that people’s decisions for
others were more in keeping with the social value than
were their decisions for themselves. Previous work has
documented that, in situations where risk taking is valued
(regarding relationships), people make more risk taking
decisions for others than for themselves. The current re-
search replicated that result and also showed that in sit-
uations where risk aversion is valued (regarding physical
safety), people make more risk-averse decisions for oth-
ers than for themselves.
These results are consistent with the idea that, when
deciding for others, people are focused primarily on a
norm regarding the “proper” way to decide, rather than
on considering the individual elements of each particu-
lar situation. Note that this conclusion can also help ex-
plain some recent findings in the literature. As one ex-
ample, Garcia-Retamero and Galesic (2012) showed that
doctors make more risk-averse decisions for their patients
than they do for themselves. Since physical safety con-
cerns are paramount in these types of decisions, it seems
likely that risk aversion was valued in their experiments.
Thus, the fact that doctors make particularly risk-averse
decisions for their patients could be explained by a norm
encouraging risk-averse decisions.
It is worth emphasizing that the observed self-other
differences in decision making occurred despite known
biases that would seemingly reduce these effects or pro-
duce effects in the opposite direction. For example, to
the extent projection effects (e.g., Fagerlin, Ditto, Danks,
Houts, & Smucker, 2001) play a role when deciding for
others, decisions for others should mirror decisions for
the self. The fact that predictions of others were similar to
self decisions in our first experiment suggests that projec-
tion may have influenced predictions of others’ decisions,
but not decisions for others. The better-than-average ef-
fect (e.g., Svenson, 1981) would suggest self-other dif-
ferences in decision making, but in the opposite direction
of what we found. If participants were motivated to see
themselves as better than others, they presumably would
have made decisions for others that were further away
from what was socially valued, not more in keeping with
the social value.
The data also are inconsistent with the idea that self-
other differences in decision making arise because peo-
ple’s self decisions are determined largely by affective
processes whereas people’s decisions for others are de-
termined by more cognitive processes, as seen for exam-
ple in the “risk-as-feelings” hypothesis (Hsee & Weber,
1997; Loewenstein et al., 2001). Affective fears (e.g.,
fear of rejection or physical harm) would plausibly lead
to more risk-averse self decisions for relationships, but
they should also lead to more risk-averse self decisions
in physical safety decisions. However, we found more
risk-averse self decisions for relationships, but more risk-
taking self decisions for physical safety situations. Con-
sider, for example, our finding that people were more
likely to put up a heavy shelf that might fall down and
cause injury than to direct a friend to do so. If self de-
cisions were more influenced by worry about the shelf
falling down, our participants should have made more
risk-averse decisions for themselves than for others, not
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less risk-averse decisions. Thus, the combination of find-
ings in the relationships and physical safety domains sug-
gests that self-other differences in decision making are
not just driven by greater affective fears in the self condi-
tion (see also Atanasov, 2013).
For similar reasons, it is difficult to reconcile our re-
sults with Polman’s (2012) claim that people are promo-
tion focused when deciding for others and prevention fo-
cused when deciding for themselves. As part of a larger
set of studies, Polman (Experiment 3a) presented partici-
pants with a set of relationship scenarios and asked them
to make decisions for themselves or for another person.
Those who made decisions for others later reported more
promotion focus than did personal decision makers, and
the reverse was found for prevention focus. This result
is in keeping with the social value placed on risk taking
in relationship scenarios. Of import is whether this same
result would hold if participants responded to physical
safety scenarios. The social values prediction is that in
such a situation the focus would switch, such that people
would be more prevention focused when deciding for oth-
ers, given the value placed on risk aversion in that situa-
tion. The reversal found by Faro and Rottenstreich (2006)
regarding self-other differences in prediction depending
on whether gains or losses were investigated also sug-
gests that the conclusion that people are more promotion
focused when deciding for others may be overly simplis-
tic.
To the extent that social values theory is accurate—that
people’s decisions for others are based to a large extent
on a norm indicating the “correct” decision—the ques-
tion remains as to why people decide for others this way.
One functional explanation is that, when making deci-
sions for others, people wish to avoid the risk of respon-
sibility. In a recent study, Leonhardt, Keller, and Pech-
mann (2011) showed that people have a preference for
indirect agency in decisions for others (versus for them-
selves) and suggested this preference occurs due to re-
sponsibility aversion. Deciding according to a decision-
making norm could thus be another effective way of relin-
quishing responsibility for the decision (see also Chang,
Chuang, Cheng, & Huang, 2012). If one were to adopt a
more consequentialist approach when making decisions
for another person, and it were to turn out badly, then that
person would likely feel guilt, if not be actively blamed
by the other person. This idea is in keeping with a recent
proposal by Atanasov (2013) that a key factor in surrogate
decision making is preserving one’s relationship with the
beneficiary, as seen in his relational model of surrogate
decision making (Atanasov, 2013). One method of main-
taining that relationship is by deciding in keeping with the
norm for how to decide in that type of situation, in much
the same way that a baseball manager would “follow the
book” in order to avoid blame. In other words, decid-
ing for others in keeping with a decision-making norm
provides protection from the type of threat to self that
would be present with a more consequentialist approach
(see Larrick, 1993).
One specific methodological element may be in part
responsible for our results as well. In each of our sce-
narios, the person being decided for asked the person to
make the decision for him or her. This act of asking the
person what to do may have served to put the decision
maker in the role of conveying society’s values. In other
words, the person who asks the question may know what
he or she should do, and is implicitly asking the decision
maker to provide support in doing that, who in turn re-
sponds by deciding in accord with what society values.
Note even if this is the case, however, the role of social
values is crucial—the response is not as simple as provid-
ing support to make a risk-taking decision, given the re-
versal in self-other differences we find between relation-
ship and physical safety scenarios. Nonetheless, a fruit-
ful avenue for future work would be to examine different
types of decision-making situations to examine the extent
to which norms drive behaviors in other types of decision
making for others. Preliminary evidence suggesting that
decision-making norms do carry over to different types
of decision situations was recently found by Dore, Stone,
and Buchanan (in press), who extended this work to de-
cisions parents make for their adolescent children.
4.2 Deciding for others versus predicting
others’ decisions
In both our experiments, we found that people’s decisions
for other people did not match their predictions for them.
In Experiment 1, participants’ predictions were similar to
their self decisions, but were substantially different from
their decisions for others. In Experiment 2, our partici-
pants made more risk-averse decisions for others than for
themselves, yet predicted others would be more risk tak-
ing than themselves. These results are consistent with the
idea that the way people go about predicting others’ de-
cisions and deciding for them are distinct phenomena.
In the previously discussed study by Garcia-Retamero
and Galesic (2012), they asked doctors to predict the de-
cisions their patients would make as well as to make
decisions for their patients. Similar to our work, they
found that the doctors’ decisions for their patients did not
match their predictions and concluded that doctors’ de-
cisions and predictions result from different underlying
processes. Unlike our work, where we posit the main dif-
ference is that people are following a norm when decid-
ing for others, Garcia-Retemero and Galesic argue that
the key difference is that doctors’ decisions are based
more on potential costs and benefits of medical treatment
than are their predictions of their patients’ decisions. Re-
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gardless of the precise mechanism for how this decision-
prediction difference arises, however, it seems clear that
prediction and decision making are distinct concepts that
need to be studied separately.
Another interesting finding emerged from Garcia-
Retamero and Galesic’s work as well. When doctors
predicted the decisions of their last patients, they were
quite accurate, similar to our participants in Experiment
1. When doctors predicted the decisions of their next pa-
tients, however, they typically predicted that they would
be more risk seeking than they actually were (in contrast
to the decisions they made for their next patients, which
were more risk averse). Thus, the pattern of results for
their next patients were similar to those in our second ex-
periment, where we found that self decisions were in be-
tween predictions and decision making for a close friend.
Garcia-Retamero and Galesic suggested that the main
reason for the difference in prediction for their next and
last patients is that doctors knew their last patient. This
conclusion is in keeping with that of Faro and Rottenstre-
ich (2006), who documented an “empathy gap” in par-
ticipants’ predictions of a randomly selected other per-
son, leading their predictions to be overly regressive, but
found that this disappeared for predictions of a close
friend (see also Hsee & Weber, 1997). That participants
were able to empathize and accurately predict the behav-
ior of their close friends is supported by our Experiment
1 results as well. Why, then, did we find a self-predict
difference in Experiment 2? Following the reasoning of
Faro and Rottenstreich, one explanation is that the situa-
tions that we used in Experiment 2 were so emotionally
charged and unfamiliar (dealing with bird flu, a radioac-
tive bomb, and the regular flu) that participants were not
able to fully empathize with how their friends would feel.
Future research should delineate more fully the condi-
tions under which an empathy gap exists in the predic-
tions of others and thus when these predictions would be
expected to be inaccurate.
For the present purposes, however, we want to reit-
erate that in the situations where self decisions, predic-
tions for others, and decision making for others have
been simultaneously studied, to our knowledge, predic-
tion errors have only occurred twice (in our Experiment
2 and for Garcia-Retamero & Galesic’s, 2012, next pa-
tients). In both cases, these prediction errors occurred in
the opposite direction of the self-other differences in de-
cision making. To the extent people’s decisions for others
are based on what is valued socially, this finding makes
sense; people want to be better than average, so they are
motivated to think that other people’s decisions will be
further away from the social value than are their self de-
cisions.
Future research could test this hypothesis by examin-
ing other prediction-decision differences for others. For
instance, Dhami and Mandel (2012, in press) found that
young adults’ forecasted risk-taking behaviors in the do-
mains of crime, health, and recreational risk were pre-
dicted by the perceived magnitude of the benefits asso-
ciated with risk taking, but not by the perceived mag-
nitude of the drawbacks, even though drawbacks were
perceived as of greater magnitude than the benefits. Ac-
cording to the present account, we might anticipate dif-
ferences in participants’ assessments for others depend-
ing on whether they were asked to make a recommenda-
tion regarding whether the other person should engage in
the risky behavior or a forecast of whether the other per-
son would engage in the behavior. The present account
predicts that the former assessments would be more risk
averse than the latter. It would also be of interest to ex-
amine whether the predictors of such assessments differ
as a function of self-other and recommendation-forecast
differences.
4.3 Practical implications
Although the primary aim of this research was to advance
our theoretical knowledge of how the process of deciding
for others is different than deciding for the self and pre-
dicting others’ decisions, a secondary contribution was
to show that when physical safety concerns are present,
decisions for others will frequently be more risk-averse
than will decisions for the self. We made no attempt to
systematically sample physical safety scenarios from a
domain of all possible scenarios and make no claim that
the self-other differences we found will hold consistently
throughout the physical safety domain. Nonetheless, the
ubiquity of this finding throughout both of our studies
suggests that greater risk aversion for others than for the
self will occur frequently in situations involving physi-
cal safety concerns. Knowing this should be beneficial
in many applied situations. For example, when choos-
ing a medical treatment plan for a loved one, it seems
likely that these decisions would be more risk-averse than
would the commensurate decision for oneself. Similarly,
when deciding about health-related issues, parents will
decide in a more risk-averse manner for their children
than they will for themselves (Dore et al., in press).
More generally, knowing that the social value cor-
responding with a situation is associated with decision
making for others in the direction of that value is useful
for making predictions in a wide range of situations. Al-
though the precise social value in a situation would not
be known in advance, research on people’s value sys-
tems has provided a good understanding of what elements
are typically valued by people. For example, Schwartz
(1992) identified 10 different values that hold universally
to at least some extent. One of these, security concerns,
underlies the physical safety scenarios used in the present
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research, and a second, stimulation, is relevant to the re-
lationship scenarios. Of course, a number of factors (cul-
tural, institutional, etc.) will influence the social value in
any particular situation (see, e.g., Rohan, 2000), but typ-
ically, knowing what values underlie a situation should
allow one to predict with a reasonable degree of accuracy
what the social value will be and thus how people will
decide for others.
Note that one limitation of this work is that it shows
how decisions for others differ from decisions for the self,
but not which process is in any sense better. Indeed, we
think strong arguments can be made either way. On the
one hand, if one assumes that people make what they be-
lieve are the optimal decisions for themselves, then de-
ciding differently for others would introduce a bias. For
example, Roszkowski and Snelbecker (1990) found that
financial service professionals make less risk-taking in-
vestment decisions for their clients than for themselves
and argued that this was due to a norm to be careful with
clients’ money. This finding arguably indicates a bias to-
wards conservatism, perhaps due to a concern that clients
will be more upset about a failed risky investment than
with excess conservatism, even if the conservative deci-
sions are not in the client’s long-term best interests when
considering the overall portfolio. A similar argument has
been made by Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) for why
managers are typically overly risk-averse. More gen-
erally, if what society values or any resulting decision-
making norm is not in keeping with one’s best interests,
then it is reasonable to expect that decisions for others
will be biased in that direction.
On the other hand, it is also not the case that self de-
cisions necessarily reflect one’s own values, as indicated
by the actual-ideal differences we found in our study. For
example, participants in our study often did not ask some-
one to dance even though their “ideal self” would. In
this type of situation, the decision made for another per-
son may better reflect the decision recipient’s own values
than his or her own decisions would. Note one impor-
tant element of the present work is that our participants
were explicitly asked to decide for another person who
had similar values to them. We expect that this situation
is common, in that many values appear to be universal
(see Schwartz, 1992). Nonetheless, if the decision maker
and decision recipient do not share the same values, then
the decision maker’s decisions will not be in the recip-
ient’s best interest, however well meaning the decision
maker may be.
Thus, this and related research document when self-
other differences occur, but do not directly address the
normative question of which should produce better deci-
sions. A parallel line of research has begun to address this
normative question by examining self-other differences
in biases such as unbalanced information search (Jonas
& Frey, 2003), information distortion (Polman, 2010),
and the omission bias (Zikmund-Fisher, Sarr, Fagerlin,
& Ubel, 2006). Combining these lines of research seems
a particularly fruitful avenue for investigation. For ex-
ample, Polman (2010) showed that there is greater pre-
decisional distortion of information with proxy decisions
than with personal decisions. In this work, there was
no option that had a clearly superior social value. In-
stead, the information distortion was in favor of the lead-
ing (tentatively preferred) option, which was determined
by previous information seen. In many cases, however,
we expect that the social value associated with a decision
option is why an alternative would be initially preferred.
Combining these two research findings thus suggests that
predecisional information distortion may be in part re-
sponsible for the finding that decisions for others are fre-
quently consistent with the social value. More generally,
an understanding of self-other differences in normative
violations should help address the issue of when making
a decision for oneself versus for another person is apt to
produce the “better” decision.
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Appendix A—Scenarios used in
Study 1 (decide for friend condition)
1. Your friend is boarding the plane for her flight and
she is nearing her seat. She sees that the person who will
be sitting next to her is already seated and clearly sick
with what seems like the flu. She knows that she gets
sick easily and she would really rather not get sick. She
knows that she can ask the flight attendant to help her find
another seat away from this sick passenger without being
rude, but it would be a bit of a hassle to do so since she
would have to wait until all of the other passengers were
seated. Your friend is unsure what to do and asks you to
decide for her. What decision would you make for your
friend?
A. ask for a different seat
B. not ask for a different seat and take her seat
2. Your friend has been dating someone for awhile and
has developed strong feelings for her guy. She’s thinking
about professing her true feelings to move her relation-
ship up to the next level, but she’s not sure of her guy’s
feelings. Your friend is unsure what to do and asks you to
decide for her. What decision would you make for your
friend?
A. tell her guy how she feels
B. wait awhile
3. Your friend has been staying up late the past few days
trying to study for her exams. Because of her lack of
sleep, it gets harder and harder to get through each day
and to stay up later at night. She knows that taking caf-
feine pills can help her stay awake longer. But she also
knows that caffeine pills are dangerous if misused and
are potentially addictive. Your friend is unsure what to
do and asks you to decide for her. What decision would
you make for your friend?
A. take the caffeine pills
B. not take the caffeine pills
4. Recently, there have been some incidents of break-
ins and other crimes around your friend’s neighborhood.
Because of the recent rise in break-ins, her neighbors
have started setting up security alarms on their apartments
and her landlord has agreed to pay most of the cost. Your
friend doesn’t have an alarm system on her place, but she
feels like her apartment complex is pretty safe. Besides,
getting an alarm system can take a lot of time to setup and
it can become annoying if it goes off by accident. Your
friend is unsure what to do and asks you to decide for her.
What decision would you make for your friend?
A. install a security system
B. not install a security system
5. Your friend is at a frat party and she spots a cute guy
across the room. She’d like to ask the guy to dance. Your
friend is unsure what to do and asks you to decide for her.
What decision would you make for your friend?
A. ask the guy to dance
B. not ask the guy to dance
6. Your friend is riding alone in a taxi. After riding in
the cab for a while, it becomes apparent to her that the
driver is drunk. There are no other taxis around or other
means of transportation. Her destination is 5 miles away,
and although it is inconvenient, it seems relatively safe to
walk. Your friend is unsure what to do and asks you to
decide for her. What decision would you make for your
friend?
A. get out of the taxi and walk
B. remain in the taxi
7. Your friend is currently trying to lose weight. She has
tried proper dieting and exercise, but the last 15 pounds
are just not coming off. She knows that taking a diet pill
might help boost her metabolism and help her lose the
extra weight. But she also knows that diet pills can have
dangerous side effects and put her at a greater risk for
heart disease. Your friend is unsure what to do and asks
you to decide for her. What decision would you make for
your friend?
A. take the diet pills
B. not take the diet pills
8. Your friend is at a frat party. She spots a guy who she
finds attractive. She is thinking of introducing herself but
feels kind of hesitant because she was looking forward to
hanging out with the girls. Your friend is unsure what to
do and asks you to decide for her. What decision would
you make for your friend?
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A. stay with the girls
B. introduce herself
9. Your friend is having difficulty concentrating lately.
She can’t seem to do as well in academics as she used to,
and she doesn’t know why. She has tried relaxation ther-
apy, yoga, and counseling, but none have worked. She is
thinking of taking a pill that works like Ritalin that could
potentially help her concentrate. But she also knows that
this pill may not be safe to take, with possible negative
side effects like affecting her moods, appetite, etc. Your
friend is unsure what to do and asks you to decide for her.
What decision would you make for your friend?
A. take this pill
B. not take this pill
10. Your friend has just moved into her apartment and
she notices that the smoke detector in her apartment is
broken. She can ask the landlord for a new one, but she’s
told by her neighbors that it would be a hassle since the
landlord is terrible about maintenance. Your friend is un-
sure what to do and asks you to decide for her. What
decision would you make for your friend?
A. ask the landlord for a new smoke detector
B. not replace the smoke detector
11. Your friend has been interested in dating a close
friend of hers for a while. She thinks he might be in-
terested in her too, but she’s not sure and she’s worried
about saying anything that might affect their friendship.
Your friend is unsure what to do and asks you to decide
for her. What decision would you make for your friend?
A. tell her friend how she feels about him
B. not tell her friend how she feels about him
12. Your friend recently moved into a new apartment,
which she likes except that the living room has nothing
in the way of a mantle or shelves on which she can put
candles and the various knick-knacks that she has. She
orders a shelf online to put up in the living room. When
it arrives, however, she finds out that this shelf is heavier
than expected. She puts it up, but it doesn’t seem very sta-
ble and she’s concerned that it might fall down, possibly
injure her cat, etc. She could get another one online, since
the place from where she ordered allows exchanges, but
then she’d have to go through the whole process all over
again. Your friend is unsure what to do and asks you to
decide for her. What decision would you make for your
friend?
A. leave the shelf up
B. get another shelf
Appendix B—Scenarios used in
Study 2 (predict condition)
On the following pages, you will be asked a number of
questions regarding three different scenarios. Please re-
spond to each question independently of each of the oth-
ers, and respond to the questions in order. There are no
right or wrong answers. We are just interested in what
you think regarding each of the scenarios.
Scenario 1—Bird Flu
Imagine that H5N1, the virus that causes bird flu, has be-
come transmissible from human to human. Hundreds of
cases have already been identified across North America,
including your city. Within a few months, as many as
100,000,000 in the United States are expected to get sick
with this human form of bird flu. Of those people, as
many as 6,000,000 may die. To date, vaccines and anti-
virals are not yet available in sufficient quantities to stop
the pandemic.
You can get flu from inhaling tiny droplets of respira-
tory fluid with flu virus in them. When an infected person
coughs, sneezes, or even talks, droplets move through the
air. Droplets can be on their hands, after they touch their
nose or mouth. Droplets can then be passed on to you
when shaking hands, or touching something another per-
son touched such as eating utensils, door knobs, or eleva-
tor buttons. You can then infect yourself as soon as your
hand touches your nose or mouth.
Wearing masks can protect you from droplets, if you
use the right masks. A good mask has a snug fit and is
made of fiber-like materials, so that droplets can not get
past it. Masks made out of cloth may not work very well,
because fluid can get through them. N-95 surgical masks
are recommended for protection against flu.
To protect yourself, you have to wear a mask whenever
you are around any other people. During a pandemic any-
one may be infected, even if they seem healthy.
Wearing masks can be a challenge for many reasons. It
can make it hard to take care of a loved one who is sick.
And if you are sick yourself, it can also be a challenge
to keep wearing a mask. You can not eat, drink, use an
inhaler, or smoke while wearing a mask. Still, the masks
have to stay on when you are around any other people.
You have to use a clean mask every time. If you put on
a contaminated mask, you can infect yourself. You also
have to be careful not to infect yourself when taking your
mask off. You have to take the mask off without touch-
ing the outside of the mask, and then carefully wash your
hands. A used mask should be thrown away. When the
mask is off, you should be careful not to touch contami-
nated surfaces and to avoid being near any other people.
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For the following questions, assume that there is an
outbreak of bird flu, and you have read the guidelines re-
garding wearing masks as described above.
1. Assume that you live in one of the cities where there
has been an outbreak of bird flu and need to decide what
to do about wearing masks. How often do you think you
would follow the guidelines for wearing masks? (Place a
slash at the appropriate spot on the line.)
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
never follow the
above guidelines
for wearing
masks
sometimes follow
the above
guidelines for
wearing masks
always follow the
above guidelines
for wearing
masks
2. Now consider a close same-sex friend of yours, with
similar values, etc. Assume that this friend lives in one of
the cities where there has been an outbreak of bird flu and
needs to decide what to do about wearing masks. How of-
ten do you think your friend would follow the guidelines
for wearing masks? (Place a slash at the appropriate spot
on the line.)
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
never follow the
above guidelines
for wearing
masks
sometimes follow
the above
guidelines for
wearing masks
always follow the
above guidelines
for wearing
masks
Scenario 2—Radioactive Bomb
Imagine that a small nuclear bomb was detonated in an
urban area. The explosion would flatten structures within
a 2 kilometer radius. Radioactive dust from the explo-
sion would be carried high into the atmosphere and trans-
ported many kilometers downwind where it would even-
tually settle back to the ground. This settled radioactive
dust, known as “fallout,” emits harmful radiation. Ex-
posure to high levels of fallout radiation can cause death
within days or weeks. Exposure to lower levels of fall-
out radiation increases the risk of developing cancer some
years after the exposure. Cancers that result from expo-
sure to fallout radiation would not appear until 5–20 years
after the radiation exposure had occurred.
As a result of radioactive decay, the intensity of ra-
diation from fallout particles decreases over time. Fifty
weeks after the explosion, for instance, radiation levels
are only 1/100 as strong as they were at 1 week after the
explosion. However, even though radiation levels many
weeks following the blast would be greatly decreased
from those shortly after blast, long-term radiation levels
could still be high enough to increase the risk of develop-
ing cancer.
Thus, following a nuclear blast, official instructions
would likely be to remain sheltered in one’s basement for
approximately one week, after which time there would be
a total evacuation of fallout-contaminated neighborhoods
to prevent further accumulation of radiation risk. Evac-
uees would find housing outside the contaminated zone
and wait until radiation levels in their fall-contaminated
neighborhoods fall to low enough levels to return to their
former neighborhood to be reoccupied.
The graph below shows how much additional cancer
risk one would assume by moving back to one’s house at
various times after the evacuation. The graph expresses
risk as the number of days, on average, that one’s life
would be shortened by cancer caused by the fallout radi-
ation received after moving back to one’s neighborhood.
For instance, if a person were to move back 6 months af-
ter evacuation, the lifespan of that person would be short-
ened by about 400 days, on average.
For each of the following questions, assume that the
government would provide temporary housing for as long
as the person chooses to stay in it, and that, whenever the
person chooses to return home, community services such
as schools, utilities, trash pickup, etc. would be available.
1. Assume that you live in a city where the above sce-
nario occurred and need to decide when to move back
to your neighborhood. When do you think you would
move back to your neighborhood? Check the response
that comes closest to your response:
__ 1 week
__ 1 month
__ 3 months
__ 6 months
__ 1 year
__ 2 years
__ 4 years
__ forever (never move back)
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2. Now consider a close same-sex friend of yours, with
similar values, etc. Assume that this friend lives in a city
where the above scenario occurred and needs to decide
when to move back to his or her neighborhood. When
do you think your friend would move back to his or her
neighborhood? Check the response that comes closest to
your response:
__ 1 week
__ 1 month
__ 3 months
__ 6 months
__ 1 year
__ 2 years
__ 4 years
__ forever (never move back)
Scenario 3—Hand Washing
An approach that has been shown to be effective for re-
ducing the transmission of flu is hand hygiene. In par-
ticular, increased hand-washing frequency has been asso-
ciated with decreased transmission of pathogens. Simi-
larly, washing hands before eating and after going to the
bathroom reduces the chance of passing a variety of in-
fections. For hand washing to be optimally effective, you
should wash your hands for 30–60 seconds.
Despite the potential effectiveness of hand washing as
a means of reducing the spread of flu, these recommended
procedures are often not followed. There are a variety
of reasons that people do not follow these recommended
procedures. Reasons include lack of knowledge of the ef-
fectiveness of hand washing, concerns with potential dry
skin that may result from frequent use of hot water and
some soaps, rough paper towels, and from not wanting to
take the time to wash one’s hands frequently.
1. Assume that it is now flu season and you have to de-
cide whether to follow the recommended hand-washing
procedures. How often do you think you would follow the
recommended hand-washing procedures? (Place a slash
at the appropriate spot on the line.)
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
never follow the
above guidelines
for hand washing
sometimes follow
the above
guidelines for
hand washing
always follow the
above guidelines
for hand washing
2. Now consider a close same-sex friend of yours, with
similar values, etc. Assume that it is now flu season and
your friend needs to decide whether to follow the rec-
ommended hand-washing procedures. How often do you
think your friend would follow the recommended hand-
washing procedures? (Place a slash at the appropriate
spot on the line.)
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
never follow the
above guidelines
for hand washing
sometimes follow
the above
guidelines for
hand washing
always follow the
above guidelines
for hand washing
